Common-mode dependencies across individually supportable cases
JADC2 Assurance Portfolio and Common-Mode Dependency Lab
Compare six fixed fictional Joint All-Domain Command and Control mission-thread assurance cases, expose what they share, and trace how one common change affects claims, evidence, verification, review, containment, and unresolved risk across the portfolio.
Research basis KW-RPT-007 KW-RPT-011 KW-RPT-013 KW-RPT-038 KW-RPT-041 KW-RPT-042 KW-RPT-043 KW-RPT-046 KW-RPT-047
Portfolio view, not portfolio approval
Several supported cases can still fail together.
JADC2 means Joint All-Domain Command and Control. CJADC2 means Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control. A kill chain is one selected ordered mission process; a kill web is the changing graph of possible mission threads; JADC2 or CJADC2 is the wider joint or combined enterprise that enables, secures, governs, tests, and sustains those threads.
A portfolio is not resilient merely because it contains more nodes, more routes, or several passing case reviews. The same clock, schema, identity service, gateway, authority record, reviewer pool, update mechanism, supplier, or operating assumption can remain a common point of failure.
Governing definitions
Four levels that must not be collapsed
Fifteen common-dependency classes
Counted redundancy is not necessarily diverse resilience.
Every dependency remains separately visible with its stable identifier, responsible shared service, and current state.
JAP-DEP-01
Shared identity and workload-trust service
Authenticates fictional services and workload state without proving that the underlying evidence is accurate.
Service: JAP-SVC-01
JAP-DEP-02
Shared trusted-time and synchronization source
Supplies fictional timing, freshness, expiry, and ordering assertions across several mission threads.
Service: JAP-SVC-02
JAP-DEP-03
Shared semantic schema and translation gateway
Defines fictional field meaning and translation behavior across otherwise different route labels.
Service: JAP-SVC-03
JAP-DEP-04
Shared data-product provenance service
Maintains fictional custody, derivation, source-artifact, and correction relationships.
Service: JAP-SVC-04
JAP-DEP-05
Shared software, model, and configuration lineage
Identifies the exact fictional artifacts used by translation, trust, path, assessment, and coordination services.
Service: JAP-SVC-05
JAP-DEP-06
Shared policy and permitted-purpose rule
Constrains fictional minimization, release, downstream use, expiry, and revocation.
Service: JAP-SVC-06
JAP-DEP-07
Shared authority and delegation record
Represents current fictional delegation, scope, expiry, revocation, and return-of-control conditions.
Service: JAP-SVC-07
JAP-DEP-08
Shared mission-partner release decision
Represents a fictional partner-specific disclosure and permitted-use decision used by selected combined cases.
Service: JAP-SVC-08
JAP-DEP-09
Shared communications and transport failure domain
Represents a common fictional gateway and dependency family beneath several differently named paths.
Service: JAP-SVC-09
JAP-DEP-10
Shared edge and regional compute capacity
Represents a bounded fictional compute and queue pool used by several analyses and reviews.
Service: JAP-SVC-10
JAP-DEP-11
Shared human-review role and workload pool
Represents fictional reviewers whose evidence access, time, competence, authority, and intervention capacity are finite.
Service: JAP-SVC-11
JAP-DEP-12
Shared assessment and reconciliation service
Compares fictional outcome records, divergent state, and return-of-control conditions across cases.
Service: JAP-SVC-12
JAP-DEP-13
Shared update and rollback mechanism
Distributes fictional software, schema, policy, and configuration updates and records rollback state.
Service: JAP-SVC-13
JAP-DEP-14
Shared supply-chain and dependency family
Represents fictional common libraries, build inputs, signing roots, and integration components.
Service: JAP-SVC-14
JAP-DEP-15
Shared operating-environment assumption
Represents fictional assumptions about communications, timing, load, evidence availability, and operating bounds.
Service: JAP-SVC-15
Eighteen abstract services and roles
Shared machinery and institutional responsibility stay visible.
JAP-SVC-01
Federated identity and workload-trust service
shared technical service
Dependency: identity-trust
JAP-SVC-02
Trusted-time and synchronization service
shared technical service
Dependency: trusted-time
JAP-SVC-03
Semantic registry and translation gateway
shared technical service
Dependency: semantic-schema
JAP-SVC-04
Evidence and provenance ledger
shared evidence service
Dependency: provenance
JAP-SVC-05
Software and configuration lineage registry
shared assurance service
Dependency: software-lineage
JAP-SVC-06
Purpose and policy decision service
shared governance service
Dependency: policy-purpose
JAP-SVC-07
Authority and delegation registry
shared governance service
Dependency: authority-record
JAP-SVC-08
Mission-partner release gate
shared partner service
Dependency: partner-release
JAP-SVC-09
Common transport and gateway family
shared infrastructure service
Dependency: transport-domain
JAP-SVC-10
Edge and regional compute pool
shared capacity service
Dependency: compute-capacity
JAP-SVC-11
Human merits-review workload pool
shared institutional role
Dependency: human-review-pool
JAP-SVC-12
Assessment and reconciliation service
shared recovery service
Dependency: assessment-reconciliation
JAP-SVC-13
Update, rollback, and recovery service
shared change-control service
Dependency: update-rollback
JAP-SVC-14
Common supply-chain dependency family
shared dependency family
Dependency: supply-chain
JAP-SVC-15
Operating-environment assumption registry
shared assurance assumption
Dependency: environment-assumption
JAP-ROLE-01
Portfolio assurance owner
institutional role
Maintains the portfolio map and current state without certifying it.
JAP-ROLE-02
Independent portfolio reviewer
institutional role
Reviews common-mode impact outside the original case and service teams.
JAP-ROLE-03
Containment and recovery coordinator
institutional role
Coordinates shared-service containment, rollback, state reconciliation, and return of control.
Fourteen distinctions
Do not promote a complete-looking portfolio into assurance theater.
Six fixed fictional assurance cases
The portfolio references existing case, claim, evidence, and verification identifiers.
It does not copy a second competing assurance model. Each portfolio case links to the current fixed mission-thread assurance catalog through stable identifiers.
JAP-CASE-01 · JMA-1-CASE
Disaster-response information routing
A fictional multi-organization network routes infrastructure-damage observations to a bounded coordination service.
- Domain
- Joint emergency support
- Shared dependency links
- 15
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
JAP-CASE-02 · JMA-2-CASE
Infrastructure-protection coordination
A fictional protective network coordinates sensor, maintenance, and service-continuity information without modeling force.
- Domain
- Critical infrastructure protection
- Shared dependency links
- 14
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
JAP-CASE-03 · JMA-3-CASE
Mission-partner awareness and releasability
A fictional mission partner contributes a minimized awareness product under explicit releasability and purpose conditions.
- Domain
- Combined information sharing
- Shared dependency links
- 15
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
JAP-CASE-04 · JMA-4-CASE
Logistics recovery after gateway loss
A fictional logistics thread reroutes status data after a gateway fails and later reconnects with divergent state.
- Domain
- Contested logistics support
- Shared dependency links
- 14
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
JAP-CASE-05 · JMA-5-CASE
Cyber-defense interpretation with contradictory evidence
A fictional defensive system compares anomaly evidence and a benign explanation before recommending containment.
- Domain
- Defensive cyber coordination
- Shared dependency links
- 13
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
JAP-CASE-06 · JMA-6-CASE
Time-critical protective support
A fictional protective thread operates under a short authority window and explicit human-review conditions.
- Domain
- Protective decision support
- Shared dependency links
- 15
- Case-specific dependencies
- 2
Eight conservative portfolio postures
Postures describe review state; they do not certify the portfolio.
Each fixed fictional case remains supportable only inside its own declared scope, versions, evidence, authority, review, and residual-risk bounds. Shared dependencies remain visible and do not create certification.
A common service or assumption is degraded or unavailable. Alternative paths require explicit diversity, capacity, and current-state review rather than a route-label substitution.
A shared provenance dependency can no longer support several cases. A generated rationale or surviving copy cannot replace the missing source lineage.
A shared schema, identity, software, configuration, or update dependency changed. Affected verification must be repeated for every dependent case and the portfolio-level interactions.
Expired authority or withdrawn permitted purpose prevents current use across every dependent case even when technical services remain available.
The shared review pool cannot provide timely, evidence-informed merits review for the affected cases. A nominal reviewer name does not cure workload or intervention limits.
Shared assessment or reconciliation state conflicts across several cases. Technical reconnection cannot silently choose which state becomes current.
An unverified artifact entered a shared update path. Containment, rollback, provenance reconstruction, independent review, and complete re-verification are required before reliance can resume.
The six fixed fictional cases remain individually supportable only within declared bounds. Their shared dependency map remains an assurance warning, not a portfolio certification.
No composite JADC2, portfolio, independence, resilience, trust, evidence, authority, review, readiness, safety, legality, mission-success, or certification score is calculated.
Containment and recovery
- Maintain the standing bounded-monitoring posture.
Required actions
- Monitor the shared dependency map, expiry, review workload, and invalidation triggers.
Warnings
- Individually supportable cases still share common dependencies and are not certified.
Required portfolio reviewers
JAP-ROLE-01Portfolio assurance owner — Maintains the portfolio map and current state without certifying it.JAP-ROLE-02Independent portfolio reviewer — Reviews common-mode impact outside the original case and service teams.
Residual unknowns
- The fixed public catalog cannot establish real-system diversity, independence, or operational behavior.
- The fixed public portfolio cannot establish real-system independence, certification, operational readiness, legal permission, or force authority.
Dependency ledger
Original and current common-dependency state
| Dependency | Shared service | Cases | Original | Current | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
JAP-DEP-01Shared identity and workload-trust service | JAP-SVC-01 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-02Shared trusted-time and synchronization source | JAP-SVC-02 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-03Shared semantic schema and translation gateway | JAP-SVC-03 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-04Shared data-product provenance service | JAP-SVC-04 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-05Shared software, model, and configuration lineage | JAP-SVC-05 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-06Shared policy and permitted-purpose rule | JAP-SVC-06 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-07Shared authority and delegation record | JAP-SVC-07 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-08Shared mission-partner release decision | JAP-SVC-08 | 3 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-09Shared communications and transport failure domain | JAP-SVC-09 | 5 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-10Shared edge and regional compute capacity | JAP-SVC-10 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-11Shared human-review role and workload pool | JAP-SVC-11 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-12Shared assessment and reconciliation service | JAP-SVC-12 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-13Shared update and rollback mechanism | JAP-SVC-13 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-14Shared supply-chain and dependency family | JAP-SVC-14 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
JAP-DEP-15Shared operating-environment assumption | JAP-SVC-15 | 6 | current | current | No selected common-mode change affects this dependency. |
Transitive case impact
Dependency → case → claim → evidence → verification
| Case | Assurance case | Original | Current | Affected dependencies | Affected claims | Evidence | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
JAP-CASE-01Disaster-response information routing | JMA-1-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
JAP-CASE-02Infrastructure-protection coordination | JMA-2-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
JAP-CASE-03Mission-partner awareness and releasability | JMA-3-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
JAP-CASE-04Logistics recovery after gateway loss | JMA-4-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
JAP-CASE-05Cyber-defense interpretation with contradictory evidence | JMA-5-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
JAP-CASE-06Time-critical protective support | JMA-6-CASE | qualified | qualified | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Affected claims
- No claim is changed in the selected baseline state.
Invalidated or changed evidence
- No evidence record is changed in the selected baseline state.
Verification to repeat
- No additional verification is required in the selected baseline state.
JADC2 assurance portfolio loaded.
Direct answers
What portfolio assurance can and cannot establish
What is a JADC2 assurance portfolio?
It is a bounded view of several fixed fictional Joint All-Domain Command and Control mission-thread assurance cases and the identity, timing, semantics, provenance, software, policy, authority, transport, review, assessment, update, supply-chain, and environmental dependencies they share.
Why are several supported cases not the same as portfolio assurance?
Each case may be supportable within its own declared bounds while several cases still rely on one shared gateway, schema, clock, identity service, authority record, reviewer pool, update mechanism, or operating assumption. One common-mode failure can therefore invalidate several cases at once.
Do different route labels prove independent resilience?
No. Two paths may have different names while sharing the same transport gateway, power source, timing service, software lineage, identity provider, management plane, reviewer pool, or supply-chain dependency.
Does technical failover preserve evidence and authority?
Not automatically. A successful failover can restore reachability while evidence lineage, permitted purpose, current authority, human-review quality, and state reconciliation remain missing or invalid.
Does this lab calculate portfolio readiness or certify JADC2?
No. It calculates no composite score and makes no safety, readiness, legality, command-authority, accreditation, certification, deployment, targeting, weapon, or force determination.
Can the portfolio lab accept real dependencies, logs, evidence, or an Evulgare handoff?
No. It accepts only one allowlisted fictional common-mode change, performs no upload or external request, and creates no real-system evidence project, account, transfer, authority, or deployment state.
Public synthetic boundary
The output is a dependency and review posture—not operational assurance.
The lab cannot optimize a real portfolio, accept real evidence, infer classified dependencies, select targets, assign weapons, recommend engagement, allocate force, calculate mission success, authorize force, determine legality, certify safety, approve deployment, or create an Evulgare evidence project.
No composite score is calculated. A complete portfolio graph makes declared common dependencies visible; it does not prove that a real system has no undeclared common modes.