Raw path count
How many complete directed paths remain in the current fictional state. More paths can provide options, but the number alone does not prove independence.
Transparent graph analysis
Resilience & Dependency Lab
Count complete paths through the fictional web, identify internal nodes and failure domains shared by those paths, and compare how deterministic disruptions contract the option space. The lab measures graph structure only—not mission success, lethality, or real-world performance.
Research basis KW-RPT-002 KW-RPT-011 KW-RPT-014
What the lab reveals
Many lines can still hide one fragile dependency.
The analysis uses only edges already marked available, compatible, authorized, and more than merely potential. It then enumerates simple paths from a sensing node to the assessment endpoint.
Source and effect diversity
How many distinct sensing starts and abstract effect nodes appear among the usable paths.
Shared internal nodes
Nodes that appear in every usable path. Their loss would break every current route even when the diagram shows many branches.
Failure-domain overlap
Named dependencies—such as a policy plane, transport family, or software service—shared by nominally different paths.
Current result
Baseline: several usable pathways
The preferred path is available and at least one alternate exists.
Interpretation boundary
- Raw path count overstates resilience because one or more internal nodes appear in every usable path.
- Several nominally different paths still share one or more failure domains.
Server-rendered analysis ready.
Usable paths
Every complete route in the current state
Paths are sorted by a transparent illustrative latency-band weight. The weight ranks this fictional graph only and is not a military performance threshold.
| Path | Source | Internal route | Effect | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Edge sensor | Edge processing → Primary relay → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Alternate effect node | Alternate effect node | 16.25 |
| 2 | Edge sensor | Edge processing → Primary relay → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Primary effect node | Primary effect node | 16.25 |
| 3 | Wide-area sensor | Federated data service → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Alternate effect node | Alternate effect node | 17.25 |
| 4 | Wide-area sensor | Federated data service → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Primary effect node | Primary effect node | 17.25 |
| 5 | Passive source | Federated data service → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Alternate effect node | Alternate effect node | 17.25 |
| 6 | Passive source | Federated data service → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Primary effect node | Primary effect node | 17.25 |
| 7 | Edge sensor | Edge processing → Alternate relay → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Alternate effect node | Alternate effect node | 18.25 |
| 8 | Edge sensor | Edge processing → Alternate relay → Option composer → Policy and trust gate → Designated authority → Primary effect node | Primary effect node | 18.25 |
Common dependencies
What every current path still shares
Option composer
orchestration-plane
100% of usable pathsPolicy and trust gate
policy-and-trust-plane
100% of usable pathsDesignated authority
designated-authority
100% of usable pathsTwo-node cut sets
Each pair below is individually replaceable, but removing both members would eliminate every enumerated path in the current graph.
- Federated data service + Edge processing
- Alternate effect node + Primary effect node
Failure-domain coverage
Different nodes can still fail together.
A failure domain is a declared dependency label in this educational graph. It can represent a shared service, transport family, policy plane, software lineage, authority, or other correlated risk.
| Failure domain | Paths using domain | Coverage | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| assessment-plane | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| command-authority | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| designated-authority | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| orchestration-plane | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| policy-and-trust-plane | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| policy-service | 8 / 8 | 100% | Common-mode dependency |
| alternate-assessment | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| alternate-effect | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| alternate-effect-plane | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| data-service | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| edge-processing-stack | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| edge-sensing | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| federated-data-plane | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| local-path | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| primary-assessment | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| primary-effect | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| primary-effect-plane | 4 / 8 | 50% | Partial overlap |
| alternate-path | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| alternate-transport-plane | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| mesh-path | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| passive-path | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| passive-sensing | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| primary-transport-plane | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| space-path | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
| wide-area-sensing | 2 / 8 | 25% | Partial overlap |
Method
A bounded, inspectable calculation
| Step | Rule |
|---|---|
| 1. Apply state | Remove scenario-disabled nodes and edges plus any additional nodes selected by the reader. |
| 2. Enforce edge gates | Keep only edges explicitly marked available, compatible, authorized, and not merely potential. |
| 3. Enumerate paths | Find directed simple paths from any available sensor-type node to the assessment endpoint, with a public safety limit. |
| 4. Identify overlap | Intersect path nodes and declared failure domains to reveal dependencies shared by every path. |
| 5. Test pair cuts | For a complete path list, identify pairs of noncritical internal nodes whose combined removal would break every path. |
| 6. Report, do not optimize | Expose counts, paths, assumptions, and warnings. Do not estimate lethality, recommend real assets, or create authority. |
Answer-ready summary
Direct answers
What does the Resilience Lab measure?
It counts complete authorized and compatible paths in the fictional graph, then identifies nodes and failure domains shared by those paths. It does not estimate mission success or real system performance.
Read the supporting pageWhy can a graph with many paths still be brittle?
Nominally different paths may still depend on the same data service, policy gate, authority, clock, software lineage, or other common failure domain.
Read the supporting pageDoes a usable path imply permission to act?
No. The lab includes only relationships already marked compatible and authorized in the synthetic model; it never creates legal or command authority.
Read the supporting page